The Starbucks Bargaining Deadlock

The current dispute between Starbucks and Starbucks Workers United shows how an employer’s distributive, resistance-based bargaining stance can create an impasse even when workers attempt to move forward with negotiations. Recent political pressure has pushed Starbucks to continue bargaining, however, the greater issue is that the company is resistant to doing so meaningfully. This has caused stalled negotiations and rising worker frustration. The impasse is not simply caused by disagreement over terms, but rather Starbucks’ strategic refusal to engage in good-faith dialogue, reflecting a deeper power imbalance in this industry. 

Starbucks' negotiation approach reflects a thought out, high-stakes competitive strategy. With regard to the Dual Concerns Model^[1], the company demonstrates a high self-concern and low concern for the union’s interests. Starbucks is focused on protecting its brand and controlling costs, using its power as a large employer to limit concessions. Its unwillingness to engage with the union is not just a lack of cooperation but rather strategy to control negotiations. By framing bargaining proposals as non-negotiable and withholding important information about future plans, Starbucks has created a really challenging bargaining environment. This directly impacts the union's ability to make any counteroffers. This distributive approach prevents any progress for resolution and reinforces a zero-sum mentality where both sides view the negotiation as win-lose.

In contrast, Starbucks Workers United is pursuing a more balanced approach, as described by Lewicki, Barry & Saunders (2010). The union’s reasonable concern for both its own outcomes and its relationship with the employer shows a willingness to find common ground. However, the union has to continue relying on disruptive tactics, like strikes and political pressure because they are being reactive to Starbucks’ approach. The union only has few alternatives left since Starbucks continues to resist their demands. This situation is an example of a constrained bargaining environment. The “Red Cup Day” strikes reflect this tactical shift. Continuous strikes keep the pressure on Starbucks, the tactical aspect is the disruptions it will cause during the holiday-season. The union aims to capitalize on peak moments for bargaining leverage. These actions show how the union's needs to adjust its strategy due to its weaker bargaining position. 

The broader context of this negotiation is also influenced by Starbucks’ internal leadership structure. As noted by Krahn, Hughes & Lowe (2015), leadership quality is crucial in determining a union's ability to negotiate effectively. However, Starbucks' corporate leadership maintains strict control over its bargaining approach and prevents any kind of decentralized, responsive strategy that could facilitate the negotiation process. This inflexibility is caused by the company’s resistance to political and public pressure, which further emphasises the apparent power imbalance. 

To move past this impasse, I would recommend several steps that could help break the deadlock: first, third-party mediation to introduce an objective party and help dialogue. Second, both sides should focus on shared interests, like operational stability and long-term profitability. This should shift the negotiation from a win-lose dynamic to one that has mutual benefits. Third, strengthening union leadership to concentrate efforts and maintain a united front would also help increase bargaining power. Lastly, the union should keep leveraging political pressure to have Starbucks continue discussions. These measures should help de-escalate the conflict and shift the bargaining environment to a cooperative negotiation, which should achieve a fair and mutually beneficial settlement.

References:

1. Cunningham, Waylon. “US Lawmakers Urge Starbucks CEO to Restart Union Talks.” Reuters, 10 Nov. 2025, www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/us-lawmakers-urge-starbucks-ceo-restart-union-talks-2025-11-10/.

2. Lewicki, Roy, Barry, Bruce, and Saunders, David. (2010). Negotiation. Chapter 4, “Negotiation: Strategy and planning.” Pp. 107 – 137.

3. Krahn, H., Karen D. Hughes, and Graham S. Lowe. Work, Industry, and Canadian Society. Seventh edition. Toronto: Nelson Education, 2015. Chapter 11, “Unions and industrial relations.” Pp. 327 – 372.

^[1] Lewicki, 2010